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Abstract 
The laws of classical logic are taken to be logical truths, and logical truths are 
taken to objectively hold. However, we might question our faith in these truths: 
why are they true? One often avoided approach is logical conventionalism, 
because it makes the logical truths dependent on somewhat intersubjective 
linguistic conventions. Another approach, proposed by Putnam (1975) and more 
recently Dickson (2001) or Maddy (2007), is to adopt empiricism about logic. 
On this view, logical truths are true because they are true of the world alone – 
this gives logical truths an air of objectivity unlike logical conventionalism. 
Putnam and Dickson both take logical truths to be true in virtue of the world’s 
structure, and the structure of the world is to be understood to be given by our 
best empirical theory, quantum mechanics. As it turns out, the structure of 
quantum mechanics apparently makes true the laws of quantum logic, and 
falsifies (one half of) the distributive law, something which was taken to be a 
logical truth under classical logic. Empiricists take this to indicate that the 
distributive law was not a logical truth to begin with. However, this argument 
assumes that there is a single determinate structure of the world prescribed by 
quantum mechanics. In this essay, I argue that this assumption is false, and that 
the structure of the world is underdetermined in quantum mechanics. Likewise, 
the choice of ‘true’ logic, as given by the world’s structure, is also 
underdetermined. This leads to what I call empirical conventionalism: the world 
alone fails to determine our logical truths. We need something broadly 
intersubjective, and thus less than objective, to fix our choice of logic even under 
empiricism. An attempt to avoid one form of conventionalism has thus led us 
back to another. 
 
1 Introduction 
Consider the distributive law over conjunctions for all sentences p, q, and r:  
 
Alongside other ‘laws’ of classical logic, CON is usually taken as a logical truth – meaning 
that regardless of the contents of p, q or r, CON objectively holds.  
We might ask: why are logical truths true? One approach takes logical truths to follow 
from meanings of subsentential operators. This seems to lead to logical conventionalism, 
(roughly) the thesis that logical truths, e.g. CON, are true ‘in virtue of meaning’ or ‘true 
by convention’ (Warren, 2016, 2). However, logical conventionalism is intuitively 
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(CON): p and (q or r) ↔ (p and q) or (p and r) 
unsatisfactory for explaining CON’s objective truth since it makes CON’s truth 
dependent on (at best) intersubjective conventions.2  
One attractive alternative is empiricism, which claims that the facts determining choice 
of logic are not conventional because they are given by the world alone, independent of 
human conventions. Empiricism, taken as the thesis that the world alone determines 
our logic, prima facie avoids the problem of intersubjectivity: a logic is objectively true 
because it is validated solely by a mind-independent world. Logical truths hold 
independent of us because there are empirical facts of the matter deciding the ‘true’ 
logic.  
How is a logic validated by the world? Maddy (2007, 226) proposes that ‘logic is true of 
the world because of its underlying structural features’. For example, I might say that 
CON is validated by the world’s CON-structure: whenever I have a red ball and either a 
blue or green ball, I have either a red and blue ball, or a red and green ball. Conversely, 
to say that CON is not validated is to say that the world does not have a CON-structure.  
The difficulty, then, is determining the world’s structure: the empiricist strategy is to 
‘read off’ logic from our best (most empirically successful) sciences (Putnam, 1975, 179), 
which I take to be quantum mechanics (QM).3 Putnam thinks this approach is superior 
to logical conventionalism:  
Anyone who really regards the choice of a logic as a 'matter of 
convention', will have to say that whether 'hidden variables exist', or 
whether, perhaps, a mysterious' disturbance by the measurement 
exists', […] is likewise a matter of convention. 
(Putnam, 1975, 191-192) 
If relevant empirical facts about QM determining the ‘true’ logic appear determinate and 
objective, empiricism has an edge over logical conventionalism in explaining CON’s 
objective truth. However, CON appears false in the logic of quantum mechanics, 
quantum logic (QL). Empiricists like Putnam (1975) and Dickson (2001) interpret this 
to mean that CON is false, and QL is instead the ‘true’ logic (Dickson, 2001, 2). The 
objectivity of empiricism thus comes at a cost: CON is, after all, a law of logic, which we 
had hoped to establish as objectively true. The empiricist might bite the bullet here and 
find forsaking CON a worthwhile price for reclaiming objectivity for logic.  
Here, I re-examine this strategy, specifically its presupposition of a determinate world-
structure prescribed by QM. In this essay, I show that the choice of world-structure in 
QM is empirically conventional: nothing within QM’s formalism, from which all empirical 
results are derived, can determine the choice of world-structure, or ‘true’ logic. The world 
alone fails to decide our logic. Putnam’s challenge to the conventionalist thus fails: those 
relevant empirical facts which determine the ‘true’ logic are still conventional, leaving 
us with yet another form of conventionalism. 
In §2, I introduce basic QM formalism – the backbone of QM’s empirical success. In §3 
I define QL on QM’s structure, and show why CON prima facie fails in QL. In §4 I present 
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two well-known interpretations of QM, each with a different interpretation of QM 
formalism and thereby different conclusions about QL’s status and CON. In §5, I argue 
that the empirical results of quantum mechanics underdetermines interpretation, and 
leads to empirical conventionalism about QM’s interpretation. A fortiori, the ‘true’ logic 
is underdetermined. This leads to a conventionalism about logic, from within 
empiricism.  
2 Basic Quantum Mechanical Formalism 
Before I describe QL, I first present QM’s formalism underpinning it: “a set of equations 
and […] calculational rules for making predictions that can be compared with 
experiment” (Cushing, 1993, 265). The formalism alone is enough to explain all 
empirical results, and its empirical success is undisputed. As Cushing notes, most 
physicists, in experimental contexts, focus exclusively on the formalism and ‘getting the 
numbers right’ (ibid, 265).  
Systems: a quantum system (the quantum analogue of classical physical 
systems) is represented by some Hilbert space 𝔎 (i.e. a complex complete inner-
product vector space). 
Observables: each observable (measurable property of the system), e.g. spin or 
momentum, is represented by a Hermitian operator4 with an associated family 
of projection operators, each projecting onto (normalized) mutually orthogonal 
one-dimensional subspaces of some 𝔎. The set of these subspaces form an 
orthonormal basis of some 𝔎 (i.e. they generate the span5 of that 𝔎). 
States: Every one-dimensional subspace of an orthonormal basis is an 
eigenstate of the observable, and represents a possible state of the system (e.g. 
spin-up, spin-down). However, since 𝔎 is constructed from the span of such 
subspaces, all of their linear combinations are also inside 𝔎, and likewise 
possible states of the system: if ψ and ϕ are distinct eigenstates of a system, 
then the superposition of the two eigenstates, a vector aψ + bϕ, where a and b 
are complex numbers such that |a2| + |b2| = 1, is itself a possible state of the 
system.  
Dynamics: A wave equation (e.g. Schrödinger’s equation) governs the dynamics 
of states in 𝔎 over time. A solution to this equation is a wave-function Ψ describing 
how a system deterministically evolves over time. 
Composite Systems: the tensor product ⨂ of multiple systems describes these 
systems. Given two systems 1 and 2 with the bases: 
 
 
A new basis for the composite system, 𝔎𝑐 , is constructed with the following possible 
states:  
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{|+𝑥
1⟩, |−𝑥
1⟩} and {|+𝑥
2⟩, |−𝑥
2⟩} 
{|+𝑥
1⟩ ⨂ |+𝑥
2⟩, |+𝑥
1⟩ ⨂ |−𝑥
2⟩, |−𝑥
1⟩ ⨂ |+𝑥
2⟩, |−𝑥
1⟩ ⨂ |−𝑥
2⟩} 
Notably, these states are irreducibly composite: For example, |−𝑥
1⟩ ⨂ |+𝑥
2⟩ cannot be 
broken down into independent sub-states |−𝑥
1⟩ or |+𝑥
2⟩; these states are entangled and 
must be described together. This is the source of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations6 
and quantum non-locality.   
Measurements: Lastly, given a measurement on a system in state  𝜓 , the 
projection postulate states that:  
 
 
Upon measurement, 𝜓 is ‘collapsed’ onto some one-dimensional subspace representing 
an eigenstate. If 𝜓 is some superposed state 𝜓 =  𝑎𝜓1 + 𝑏𝜓2, the postulate states that 𝜓 
‘collapses’ into one of two eigenstates ψ1 or ψ2, with the Born rule prescribing 
probabilities for the states occurring as |𝑎2| and |𝑏2| respectively. Thus, in considering 
whether a system is in state 𝜓1  or  𝜓2 , we must calculate it via calculating the 
probabilities of |𝑎2| and |𝑏2| from 𝑎𝜓1 + 𝑏𝜓2. 
 
3 Basic Quantum Logic 
3.1 𝔎’s structure, and QL 
 
The set of all possible subspaces of 𝔎, 𝑆(𝔎). 𝑆(𝔎) has a structure: it is a partially ordered 
lattice 𝐿(𝔎), with P ⩽ Q defined as P being a subspace of Q in 𝔎. For any two subspaces 
in 𝐿(𝔎), there is a greatest subspace common to both (the infimum), and a smallest 
subspace containing them both (the supremum). Following Hughes7, I define meet (∧) 
and join (∨) on subspaces in 𝐿(𝔎):  
 
 
 
While the meet/infimum of two subspaces is equivalent to their intersection, the 
join/supremum of two subspaces is not their union in the classical sense. Rather, it is 
their span, viz. the plane containing the two subspaces and all their possible linear 
combinations. Indeed, a union of two subspaces is in general not a subspace in 𝔎.8 This 
reflects QM’s principle that, if any two states are possible states of a system, then, at 
the same time, so too is their linear combination.   
In 𝐿(𝔎) every subspace is a subspace of 𝔎, and the subspace of every member of 𝐿(𝔎) is 
the origin vector 0. Hence, 𝔎 is the maximum element, and 0 the minimum element, 
of 𝐿(𝔎). 
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8 Specifically, 𝑃 ∪ 𝑄 is a subspace iff one of them is contained in the other.  
𝜓 =  ∑ 𝑎𝑘
𝑘
𝜓𝑘  →  𝜓𝑗  
(Meet) 𝑃 ∧ 𝑄 = 𝑃 ⋂ 𝑄 
(Join) 𝑃 ∨ 𝑄 =  ⋂{𝑁: 𝑁 ∈  𝑆(𝔎) and P ⩽ N, Q ⩽ N} 
The orthocomplement 𝑃⊥ of any subspace P is such that 𝑃 ∨ 𝑃⊥ =  𝔎, 𝑃 ∧ 𝑃⊥ =  0, (𝑃⊥)⊥ =
𝑃, and P ⩽ Q implies 𝑄⊥ ⩽ 𝑃⊥. Two subspaces P and Q are orthogonal, 𝑃 ⊥ 𝑄, iff P ⩽ 𝑄⊥.  
We can quite naturally define QL as a formal logic on 𝐿(𝔎). First we start with a set of 
logical vocabulary {‘˅QL’, ‘&’, ‘∼’}, and take the propositions to be handled by QL to be all 
experimental propositions, 𝑥𝑝,which may be asked of a system, of the form ‘will the 
system pass a test for some possible state P with probability 1?’ (Bacciagaluppi, 2009, 
9) A function  𝑓: 𝑥𝑖 →  𝐿(𝔎)  then puts the set of these propositions 𝑥𝑖  into bijective 
correspondence with 𝐿(𝔎). For each proposition 𝑥𝑝, 𝑥𝑞 ∈ 𝑥𝑖, and subspaces 𝑃, 𝑄 ∈  𝐿(𝔎), 
 
 
 
 
Clearly, ‘&’, ‘∨𝑄𝐿’ and ‘~’ parallel the meet (˄), join (˅) and orthocomplement (⊥) operations 
on 𝐿(𝔎).  
Lastly,9 I define logical consequence as:  
 
 
 
3.2  The Status of CON 
 
With QL set up, I return to the issue raised in §1. Recall the empiricist claim: QL, based 
off the structure of QM, apparently shows that CON is false. Consider QL’s equivalent 
of CON:  
 
 
This holds iff:  
         (CON†): 
 
Suppose that P and Q are orthogonal, and R = P + Q: 
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𝑓(𝑥𝑝 & 𝑥𝑞) iff 𝑓(𝑥𝑝) ∧ 𝑓(𝑥𝑞) = 𝑃 ∧ 𝑄 
𝑓(𝑥𝑝 ∨𝑄𝐿 𝑥𝑞) iff 𝑓(𝑥𝑝) ∨ 𝑓(𝑥𝑞) = 𝑃 ∨ 𝑄 
𝑓(~𝑥𝑝) iff [𝑓(𝑥𝑝)]
⊥ = 𝑃⊥ 
𝑥𝑝 ⊨𝑄𝐿 𝑥𝑞 iff 𝑓(𝑥𝑝) ⩽ 𝑓(𝑥𝑞) = P ⩽ Q 
(CON*): 𝑥𝑅 & (𝑥𝑃 ∨𝑄𝐿 𝑥𝑄)  ↔  (𝑥𝑅 & 𝑥𝑃) ∨𝑄𝐿 (𝑥𝑅 & 𝑥𝑄) 
𝑅 ∧ (𝑃 ∨ 𝑄) = (𝑅 ∧ 𝑃) ∨ (𝑅 ∧ 𝑄) 
  
 
 
 
Clearly, (𝑅 ∧ 𝑃) = 0 and (𝑅 ∧ 𝑄) = 0, i.e. they only intersect at 0. Therefore, 0 ∨ 0 = 0 on 
the right-hand side of CON†. However, consider the left-hand side: the intersection of 
the plane containing P and Q, and the subspace R is clearly R itself, since the entirety 
of R is on the plane. Since 0 ≠ 𝑅, CON† is false. A fortiori, CON* is false.  
Objection: nothing so far shows that the classical CON, employing ‘and’ and ‘or’, has 
broken down. Rather, I merely demonstrated the falsehood of CON*, using ‘&’ and ‘∨𝑄𝐿’, 
on a restricted class of experimental propositions. Thus Maudlin (2003, 491) complains 
that “quantum 'logic' isn't logic, i.e. isn't an account of conjunction and disjunction”. To 
show that CON*’s failure entails CON’s failure from an empirical perspective, proponents 
of QL must show that QL is classical logic – we just got the logical behaviour of ‘or’ wrong.  
I think this requires us to first claim that, in the context of experimental propositions, 
there is (a) no connective ‘or’ that is meaningfully definable, and (b) the best replacement 
for ‘or’ is ‘∨𝑄𝐿’. Furthermore, (c) we must show that the experimental propositions of QL 
exhaust the propositions about the world. In other words, the structure of QM must 
completely describe the world. Without (c), then the proponent of classical logic can still 
claim that the world is really classical, and the non-classical nature of QL only arises in 
the context of measurements: the world alone still gives us classical logic. Given (a) – 
(c), though, the proponent of QL can assert that there is no other way to ‘read off’ 
disjunction from the structure of the world without using ‘∨𝑄𝐿’. This, together with the 
empiricist assumption that logic is given by the world alone, justifies the claim that ‘or’ 
was really ‘∨𝑄𝐿’ all along: CON* is really CON, and since CON* is false, so is CON. 
Within the context of experimental propositions, there is justification for (a): there is no 
clear way to introduce ‘or’ within QM’s structure since there is, in general, no 
experimental proposition or subspace in 𝔎 corresponding to the classical disjunction of 
P and Q (Bacciagaluppi, 2009, 19). Furthermore, the one special case where P ∪ Q is a 
subspace, viz. when one of the subspaces is contained in the other, can be interpreted 
in terms of the span of P and Q as well. Lastly, it is clear that the span of P and Q is 
widely used experimentally, in e.g. considering superposed states of P and Q. Thus, 
either there is no experimental proposition corresponding to P ∪ Q, or P ∪ Q can be 
understood as the span of P and Q in the special case, which in turn applies generally 
in QM. This gives us reason to claim that we cannot even speak of the classical ‘or’ 
meaningfully in terms of experimental propositions. 
Dickson (2001, 4) further argues for (b), claiming that ‘∨𝑄𝐿’ is the only other plausible 
candidate for replacing our classical ‘or’, since ‘∨𝑄𝐿’ satisfies most of our constraints on 
‘or’. It is worth looking at the logical behaviour of ‘∨𝑄𝐿’ to see its similarity to ‘or’. For 
example: 
 𝑃 ⩽ 𝑃 ∨ 𝑄 
𝑄 ⩽ 𝑃 ∨ 𝑄 
 
 Consequently: 
 
 
Notably, this is reminiscent of the introduction rules for ‘or’. Furthermore:  
 
 
 
This is also similar to the elimination rules for ‘or’. ‘∨𝑄𝐿’ thereby appears to behave like 
the classical ‘or’. Of course, ‘∨𝑄𝐿’ behaves differently in other contexts, notably CON.10 
However, given (a), ‘∨𝑄𝐿’ seems the closest substitute for our classical intuitions about 
disjunctions in the context of experimental propositions. 
 
4 Two Interpretations: Quantum Logic as Global Logic? 
(a) and (b) concludes that classical logic cannot be ‘read off’ the structure of 
experimental propositions in QM. However, what about (c) – do experimental 
propositions exhaust all propositions about the world? I argue that there are at least 
two ways11 to understand the world-structure QM prescribes and QL’s experimental 
propositions: this suggests that philosophical claims based on QM are “highly 
dependent on the interpretational approach one adopts towards the 
theory”(Bacciagaluppi, 2009, 36-37). 
 
4.1  Bohmian ‘Pilot-Wave’ Interpretation 
Bohm’s ‘pilot-wave’ interpretation (BM) takes every particle to have determinate positions 
and trajectories. However, particles are guided by a ‘pilot-wave’ obeying the wave-
function Ψ, causing Bohmian particles to evolve in a uniquely quantum fashion. This 
wave-function also generates a statistical distribution of the particles’ positions, P = 
|Ψ2|. This set-up allows BM to uncontroversially satisfy the constraints of QM 
formalism, as introduced in §2, e.g. the Born rule, and recovers all empirical results of 
QM. 
However, on BM’s view, QM formalism is merely epistemic in nature. As Bohm notes: 
“The use of statistics is […] not inherent in the conceptual structure, but merely a 
consequence of our ignorance of the precise initial conditions of the particle” (Bohm, 
1952, 171). QM formalism is simply an effective tool for us to calculate the properties of 
particles, given that the determinate but hidden, level of phenomena – particles with 
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𝑥𝑃 ⊨𝑄𝐿 𝑥𝑃 ∨𝑄𝐿 𝑥𝑄 
𝑥𝑄 ⊨𝑄𝐿 𝑥𝑃 ∨𝑄𝐿 𝑥𝑄 
 
If 𝑥𝑃 ⊨𝑄𝐿 𝑥𝑅 and 𝑥𝑄 ⊨𝑄𝐿 𝑥𝑅, 
then 𝑥𝑃 ∨𝑄𝐿 𝑥𝑄 ⊨𝑄𝐿 𝑥𝑅 
determinate positions/trajectories – postulated by BM lies beyond the reach of 
measurement. However, in BM, particles are really ontologically classical (Bacciagaluppi, 
2009, 30-31). 
Particularly, in the case of superpositions and ‘˅QL’: under BM, if a system is in a 
superposed state, then Ψ ‘pilots’ particles to two states with a frequency distribution 
obeying the Born rule. However, importantly, the particles themselves are either in 
‘support’ of one state or another in the classical sense: “the [position/trajectory] 
configuration of the system is located only in one of these different components, and 
this is already a matter of classical logic” (Ibid, 31). 
On this deeper level, particles are in some determinate position at any one time, and all 
other properties are further derived from position variables on BM’s view. The world is 
fundamentally classical, and CON remains true. The use of spans – and ‘˅QL’ – instead 
of classical union in QL reflects not the world, but our inability to access the level of 
hidden variables: the ‘non-classical’ nature of QL arises from our epistemic limitations.  
It is thus inadmissible to claim that QL’s experimental propositions exhaust all 
propositions about the world. Experimental propositions reflect not the totality of the 
world, but the limits of our epistemic access to the world. QL is, under BM, merely a 
logic of measurements and cannot be taken to conclusively replace classical logic (and 
thereby falsify CON). 
 
4.2 Many-Worlds Interpretation 
Contrariwise, the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) claims that QM’s formalism, and the 
experimental propositions of QL, completely describes the universe. However, on this 
view, our ‘world’ is but one ‘branch’ of the universe. 
Consider a measurement device 𝜙 which points up | ↑𝝓⟩ when an electron is spin-up, 
points down | ↓𝝓⟩ when an electron is spin-down,  and points nowhere | ⊘𝝓⟩ when there 
is no electron. Furthermore, an observer, O, can likewise be considered a system: 
Suppose O observes 𝜙 pointing a certain direction when 𝜙 in fact points in that direction. 
Let  | ↑𝑶⟩ , | ↓𝑶⟩,  and | ⊘𝑶⟩  represent these O-states. Given a system E of a spinx-1/2 
electron prepared in a superposed state 𝑎|+𝑬⟩ + b|−𝑬⟩, we can construct a composite 
system E ⨂ 𝜙 ⨂ 𝑂. Thus, when O observes 𝜙 measuring E: 
 
 
 
 
However, instead of saying 𝑎|+𝑬⟩ ⨂ | ↑𝛟⟩ ⨂ | ↑𝑶⟩ +  𝑏|−𝑬⟩ ⨂ | ↓𝛟⟩ ⨂ | ↓𝑶⟩  ‘collapses’ into 
𝑎|+𝑬⟩ ⨂ | ↑𝛟⟩ ⨂ | ↑𝑶⟩  or 𝑏|−𝑬⟩ ⨂ | ↓𝛟⟩ ⨂ | ↓𝑶⟩ upon interaction with  𝜙  (per the projection 
postulate), MWI claims that the universe is in both states simultaneously – the universe 
remains superposed. This seems absurd since our measurements show one definite 
result. However, the phenomenology of measurement, and the projection postulate, is 
explained away in MWI by saying that we, as O, are entangled with one particular 
measurement outcome or another – from (one of) our perspective(s), only one outcome 
obtains. Furthermore, 𝑎|+𝑬⟩ ⨂ | ↑𝛟⟩ ⨂ | ↑𝑶⟩  and 𝑏|−𝑬⟩ ⨂ | ↓𝛟⟩ ⨂ | ↓𝑶⟩  rapidly decohere 12 
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  (𝑎|+𝐸⟩  +  𝑏|−𝐸⟩) ⨂ | ⊘ϕ⟩ ⨂ | ⊘𝑂⟩  →  𝑎|+𝐸⟩ ⨂ | ↑ϕ⟩ ⨂ | ↑𝑂⟩ +  𝑏|−𝐸⟩ ⨂ | ↓ϕ⟩ ⨂ | ↓𝑂⟩  
following measurement, due to environmental interferences, and become dynamically 
independent of one another. For all practical purposes, then, there is only one definite 
state relevant to us (‘one of’ us). The other ‘world’ is effectively inaccessible.  
 
Thus, MWI accounts for exactly the same empirical results as BM, and, as before, QL 
works as a logic of measurements. However, according to MWI, and unlike BM, the 
formalism of QM and the possible experimental propositions – corresponding to possible 
subspaces of 𝔎 – are not just propositions about measurements or reflections of our 
epistemic limits: rather, they are genuine propositions about the universe.  
 
Prime example: MWI takes superposed states as actual states of single particles, not 
stochastic distributions of classical particles into possible states per BM. On MWI, 
systems which are in superposed states stay so after measurement unlike BM, where 
particles are in either some determinate state or another. On MWI, each component 
state of the superposition actually obtains, albeit in dynamically independent ‘worlds’. 
In considering the classical union of two states of a system, then, we must consider the 
span of the two states where we find their linear combination, i.e. the actual state of the 
universe. Hence, we see that propositions about the universe behave like the 
experimental propositions of QL in that they map onto the lattice-structure of 𝐿(𝔎): QL 
under MWI replaces classical logic as the ‘true’ logic of the world. 
Furthermore, MWI explains why classical logic has been so successful from our 
perspective: CON is validated by our ‘world’, which is decohered from other worlds (in 
everyday macroscopic scenarios) – only one of the quantum disjuncts obtain from our 
perspective. However, we were mistaken to think that our ‘world’ is all there is to the 
universe. Both quantum disjuncts really do obtain in the universe, and the universe is 
described completely by QM and the experimental propositions in QL. Thus (c) obtains, 
and we might claim that CON is really not validated by the world. Turning BM on its 
head, on MWI it is classical logic that arises from our epistemic limitations.  
 
5 Empirical (Under)-Determination of Interpretation and Logic 
I began by asking why logical truths are true. Hoping to avoid the conventionalist path, 
I turned to empiricism. However, §4 shows that the world alone, given by our best 
sciences, cannot give a decisive answer to whether experimental propositions exhaust 
all propositions about the world. Though BM and MWI are empirically equivalent, each 
reproducing QM’s empirical results, each interpretation includes postulations about the 
world (hidden variables or dynamically independent worlds) beyond empirical reach. 
These interpretations also take different logics to be the universally true logic. This leads 
us to conclude that empirical evidence alone fails to determine the logic of the world: 
The 'true' logic, under empiricism, remains underdetermined.  
I propose this situation leads back to conventionalism. Here, conventionalism is not the 
thesis that logic is ‘true by meaning’ or ‘convention’. It makes no substantive claims 
about the truth-status of logical truths. Rather, this conventionalism is analogous to 
the situation for our universe’s ‘ultimate’ space-time structure. It is generally agreed 
that that is conventional, in the sense that general relativity “allows for a wide variety of 
cosmological models but that, due to structure internal to the theory itself, does not 
allow us to determine which of these models best represents our universe” (Manchak, 
2009, 53).  
This applies for QM and its various interpretations: “no amount of evidence will ever 
compel us to embrace a particular scientific claim” (Ibid, 53) about QM’s interpretation. 
This is what I call empirical conventionalism, which is described by Sklar as such: 
“insofar as the two theories have the same predictive content with regard to the directly 
observable facts, they ought to be viewed as merely conventional alternatives to one 
another and not as genuinely alternative theories about the nature of the world” (Sklar, 
2004, 958). In other words, QM formalism and its empirical results is in principle 
indifferent between interpretations.  
This is old news in physics – many have been willing to ‘shut up and calculate’, ignoring 
interpretative questions precisely because of empirical conventionalism. What is new to 
us is the result that the choice of ‘true logic’ is also empirically conventional. No 
empirical evidence can determine whether QL or classical logic is true; this choice is 
arbitrary from an empirical perspective. Thus Belousek (2005, 673) concludes: “the 
‘book of nature’ proves too ambiguous to be uniquely interpretable”. 
Cushing’s solution is to go beyond empirical facts of the matter “to include factors such 
as fertility, beauty, coherence, naturalness and the like” (Cushing, 1993, 272). However, 
it is unclear what evidence can empirically settle the debate here, since all empirical 
results (ever) available to the two interpretations are equivalent. In any case, to rely on 
such extra-empirical factors is to give up on empiricism. Rather, logic choice is 
determined partly by human factors, which are at best intersubjective. To go down this 
route is to lose the objectivity of logic even on the empiricist view, yet it seems that, at 
least within QM, we must go down this route.  
This distinction between unempirical and empirical facts can be further clarified with 
Putnam’s (1974, 33) distinction between two types of facts constraining what he calls 
total science: 
 
 
 
Here, an interpretation is chosen not only because it coheres with all possible empirical 
facts, viz. ECC, but also because of simplicity, intuitiveness, fecundity, etc., viz. ICC. 
Putnam suggests that ICC provides a further fact of the matter that decides between 
seemingly empirically conventional choices.  
Two points: first, I think the acceptance of ICC simply makes the unempirical elements 
involved in interpretational choice more obvious. While something can be a determinate 
fact of the matter given such constraints, these constraints of simplicity, intuitiveness, 
etc., are exactly what appear to be intersubjective. Even if there could be a decisive fact 
of the matter given some choice of ICC, I am not sure we could ever find objective 
grounds for ICCs themselves. The choice of a determinate interpretation with ICC thus 
comes at a loss of objectivity.  
Secondly, it is unclear whether there even is a fact of the matter under ICC whether BM 
or MWI is better. To me, at least, it is not apparent whether BM or MWI, presented above, 
is simpler, or more intuitive. Given the complicated nature of QM, and the technical and 
(ICC) Internal Coherence Constraint:     Science must cohere with simplicity, and 
agreement with intuition, and so on. 
(ECC) External Coherence Constraint:   Science must agree with experimental checks, i.e. 
empirical facts.  
conceptual apparatus required for both BM (hidden level of phenomena, distinct pilot-
waves guiding quantum particles, non-locality) and MWI (a world of infinite ‘worlds’, 
decoherence as a rough-grained process), neither BM nor MWI obviously satisfies any 
given ICC (e.g. simplicity, etc.) better than the other. One is ultimately left to one’s 
metaphysical predilections.  
In any case, the empiricist would have lost much in adopting ICC. Recall that empiricism 
aims to place logical truths on firmer grounds than logical conventionalism. Empiricism 
does so by appealing to the world because the relevant empirical facts determining a 
‘true’ logic are intuitively objective in a way our linguistic conventions are not. However, 
even within empiricism, there is no determinate interpretational choice for QM. ECC 
does not suffice for any decision on the true world-structure and the ‘true’ logic; we 
must appeal to ICC, be it simplicity, intuition, or what-not. Regardless of the outcome 
of that debate, the resulting situation is certainly not objective as the choice seems to 
amount to something about us, as rational beings, as scientists, and so on. 
Consequently, the world alone has failed to give us the ‘true’ logic. Empiricism thus fails 
to obtain objectivity for logic, leading instead to empirical conventionalism. It is no 
longer clear whether this is more attractive than logical conventionalism.  
  
6 Conclusion 
Empiricists who want to recover the objectivity of logic by appealing to the world alone 
must recognize that our best theory of the world, QM, is underdetermined when it comes 
to the world-structure it prescribes. This entails that the ‘true’ logic is likewise 
empirically conventional – we have no empirical reason to think that CON (and classical 
logic) is true of the world or otherwise, because the true structure of the quantum world 
is unknown (indeed, unknowable). Adopting ICC to determine our ‘true’ logic only 
ameliorates this situation by basing our choice of logic on intersubjective – not quite 
objective – facts. Thus, empiricism, with its associated empirical conventionalism about 
logic, appears no better off than logical conventionalism in accounting for the objectivity 
of logical truths: something broadly conventional lurks.  
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